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Abstract 
In the debate on globalisation of the financial markets and its effect on corporate gov-
ernance it is often claimed that the pressure for higher rates of return exerted by institu-
tional investors in the name of shareholder value, has led to a fundamental change of 
company policy among listed companies. Due to short-term profit orientation and in-
creased dividend pay-outs to investors, the critiques argue, long-term development of 
the innovation potential of these companies will suffer, and this ultimately will have 
negative consequences on employment and growth. Since in the 1990s almost all major 
German companies listed on the stock exchange have declared their commitment to the 
principles of shareholder value. Hitherto there is little empirical evidence of the conse-
quences of such an orientation on company-internal structures and processes. The pre-
sent case study on the Volkswagen AG helps to close this gap. Central questions in this 
study are the following: To what extent have the distinct characteristics of Volks-
wagen’s corporate governance systems changes in response to shareholder value de-
mands? What is the role of the stock market for the company? Have the incentive sys-
tems and the systems of target setting and controlling changed to better correspond with 
shareholder expectations, and what are the effects on investment/disinvestments deci-
sions and thus on the long-term innovation potential of the firm? And finally, what are 
the effects on the economic and the financial performance of the company? 
Zusammenfassung 
In der Diskussion über die Globalisierung der Finanzmärkte und der Veränderungen der 
Corporate Governance wird häufig die These vertreten, dass der von institutionellen 
Investoren ausgehende, verschärfte Renditedruck und die Verbreitung des Shareholder-
Value-Konzepts zu einer stärker kapitalmarktorientierten Unternehmensführung bei den 
börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften führen. Damit ist auch die Befürchtung verbun-
den, eine kurzfristige Gewinnorientierung und vermehrte Gewinnausschüttungen an 
Investoren könnten zu Lasten der langfristigen Entwicklung von Innovationspotentialen 
in den Unternehmen gehen und damit letztlich negative Auswirkungen auf Wachstum 
und Beschäftigung haben. Seit den 1990er Jahren proklamieren auch in Deutschland die 
großen börsennotierten Unternehmen fast durchgängig die Einführung einer „wertorien-
tierten Unternehmensführung“, d.h. eine stärkere Orientierung am Kapitalmarkt. Bisher 
existieren noch kaum empirische Studien zu den Auswirkungen einer solchen Orientie-
rung auf unternehmensinterne Strukturen und Prozesse. Die vorliegende Fallstudie zur 
Volkswagen AG hilft, diese Lücke zu schließen. Zentrale Fragen der Studie sind, wel-
che Rolle das Verhältnis zum Kapitalmarkt für VW spielt und in der Vergangenheit 
gespielt hat, inwieweit eine Veränderung der Corporate Governance als Resultat der 
von den Investoren ausgehenden Anforderungen feststellbar ist und wie sich diese ggf. 
auf die Ziel- und Controllingsysteme sowie die Anreizsysteme für das Management 
auswirken und welche Folgen dies wiederum auf Investitions- bzw. Desinvestitionsent-
scheidungen und die Entwicklung der langfristigen Investitionspotentiale des Unter-
nehmens hat. 
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1. General Background and Aims of the Study1 
The car industry has come under pressure of the capital markets. It has been singled out 
a major value destroyer in terms of shareholder value. The low market capitalization of 
some of the companies puts them under threat of a hostile take-over. Institutional inves-
tors voice their discontent about corporate governance structures in the car industry. In 
sum, there is a strong pressure on companies to change their traditional corporate gov-
ernance systems.  
In the German economy, the car industry plays a key role. It has been at the centre of 
the debate about the “German model” both with regard to its strengths and weaknesses. 
It is a major employer and in its employment pattern representative for long-term well-
paid jobs. The car industry is the most important power base for Germany’s strongest 
union, IG Metall, and crucial for the further development of Germany’s co-
determination system.  
In the 1990s the industry experienced profound restructuring. Owing to the 1992-1995 
recession, the adoption of lean production practices and business reengineering, em-
ployment levels fell by a third, process/supply chains were redefined, and company 
structures reorganized. The latter included decentralization of management responsibili-
ties, the introduction of business units as profit or cost centres and finance-oriented ob-
jectives for the managers of these units. Restructuring continued through the latter half 
of the 1990s, driven by the wave of mergers and acquisitions, which particularly af-
fected the supplier sector.  
By the end of the 1990s the traditional system of corporate governance (as described in 
our country report Jürgens/Rupp 2001) entered a period of transformation. Capital mar-
ket and shareholder value orientations became more important. This shift was driven by 
a range of factors and events: 
– The adoption of new controlling methods for companies after restructuring and de-
centralization was the first major driving force. In the mid-1990s Daimler, Siemens, 
VEBA and a number of other major companies took a lead in this respect.  
– Mergers & Acquisitions became the second major driving force in the second half of 
the 1990s. The merger between Daimler and Chrysler gave the starting shot fol-
lowed by the acquisition of Rover by BMW, and purchases of a number of luxury 
brands by Volkswagen. Consolidation in the automotive supplier sector also in-
creased the importance of equity-facilitated M&As. 
– The Neuer Markt and IT bubble made the traditional industrial sectors look old. 
Investors turned their backs at the very moment companies wanted to mobilize eq-
uity to finance their M&A strategies. 
– Institutional investors, in particular from Anglo-Saxon countries, exercised pressure 
to introduce new corporate governance standards and to de-conglomerate. 
                                                 
1 A research project funded by the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) Programme of the 
European Commission (DGXII) under the Fourth Framework Programme, European Commission 
(Contract no.: SOE1-CT98-1114; Project no: 053), coordinated by William Lazonick and Mary 
O’Sullivan at the European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD). I particularly want to 
thank Bill Lazonick and Thomas Sablowski for their critical comments and their support for this 
study. 
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– Government measures fostered the unbundling of cross-shareholding in a reform of 
taxation; the debate about a takeover code/law. 
With many small and medium suppliers being taken over by US-American companies 
and German companies becoming aware of the possibility of equity-facilitated M&A, 
and with the increasing importance of institutional investors, shareholder value orienta-
tions have made their entry into the industry. Hostile takeovers have become a concern 
even for flagship companies like DC and VW. 
The central question of the study is how this shift towards an increased role of capital 
markets and of shareholder value orientations affects corporate governance. (Our gen-
eral understanding of corporate governance is as a process of allocating resources and 
returns, cf. O’Sullivan/Lazonick 2000). The central questions in this study are the fol-
lowing: 
1. To what extent have the distinct characteristics of the companies’ corporate govern-
ance systems changed in response to capital market/shareholder value demands? 
2. What is the role of stock markets for the companies, and to what extent do they rely 
on stocks to finance their operations? 
3. Have incentive systems changed in the direction of capital market-oriented perform-
ance measures? 
4. Have systems of target-setting and controlling changed to better correspond with 
shareholder expectations? 
5. What were the effects on investment/disinvestment decisions? What is the effect on 
the long-term innovation potential of the firms? 
6. What are the effects on economic and financial performance? 
The study is based on company interviews and on data analyses from annual reports and 
other publicly available sources. In view of the early stage of the development, it is ex-
pected that there will be few, if any, hard data on a shift towards a new, more capital-
oriented corporate governance system. The expectation is that changes, if they exist, 
will be more likely in the realm of attitudes, planning and the setting up of new proce-
dures. Such changes can only be assessed on the basis of interviews with observers and 
protagonists within the companies. This paper is structured as follows: The following 
chapter provides some background information about the German car industry. Chapter 
3 deals with case studies carried out at Volkswagen. Chapter 4: Summary and conclu-
sions. 
2. The German Car Industry – Industry Structure and 
the Role of the Corporate Sector 
According to the 2001 Yearbook on International Auto Statistics by the Association of 
the Automobile Industry (VDA), the German car industry (manufacturers of motor ve-
hicles and motor vehicle parts, NACE 34) comprises around 2,500 enterprises with a 
total workforce of 890,000. 
In 2000 the car industry accounted for 11.7% of employees in total manufacturing, and 
18.2% in terms of turnover of total manufacturing. As the table shows, the weight of the 
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car industry in terms of turnover has increased considerably since 1996. By interna-
tional comparison this is the greatest weight the car industry has in any country (in 
terms of turnover Mexico is equal with around 18%, Sweden follows with around 16%; 
cf. VDA, 2001, pp. 336ff.). The rather successful development of the German car indus-
try can also be seen from an increase of the share of the car industry in total 
manufacturing turnover from 15.4% in 1997 to 18.2% in 2000. This increase went along 
with a slight decrease in the share of persons employed (from 12.1% to 11.7.%; see 
VDA, 2001, pp. 110f.). 
Wage and salary levels in the automotive industry are high both in inter-sectoral com-
parison within Germany as in comparison with other countries. Calculated per em-
ployee hour on an yearly average, the German auto industry had the highest wage costs 
since 1985 up to the year 2001. Average working hours per year and employee in 1999 
were 1,492 compared to 2,152 hours per year in the USA and 2,012 hours per year in 
Japan. Between 1987 and 1999 the effective yearly working time per employee was 
reduced by 63 hours (VDA, 2000, p. 47). 
Labour productivity is high. According to VDA it was highest in Europe with DM 83 
per hour (however, lower than the DM 100 per hour in the USA and DM 94 per hour in 
Japan). 
In terms of innovation the industry comes out well in the statistics, too. Contrary to the 
general trend in Germany, the industry has increased spending on research and devel-
opment by two thirds since 1990. In 1997 it spent DM 14.7 billion on R&D, 24% of 
total business sector R&D spending in Germany that year. In 1995 50,000 persons were 
engaged in R&D, 6% more than in 1991. The effects are evident in patent statistics. The 
automotive sector registered 1,892 patents in 1990, 2,940 in 1996 (out of a total of 
9,342 patents registered world-wide). Thus 31% per cent of patents registered in 1995 
were German, compared to 25% Japanese and 19% US-American; German patents 
make up 60% out of the total of European patents in this sector) (VDA, 1999, p. 43). 
Innovation expenditure by the transport vehicle industry (90% of which is the car indus-
try) in 1998 made up almost a third of total innovation spending by the manufacturing 
industry as a whole (33.4 of DM 109 billion). It has increased since the 1990s and there 
is no sign that the trend is leveling out. Thus the general picture does not provide evi-
dence that innovation activities are slowing down owing to a shift of company priorities 
in the recent years. 
During the 1990s the auto industry increased its “human capital intensity” considerably. 
The percentage of university (and technical college) graduates among total white collar 
workers increased from 26.3% in 1990 (total manufacturing industry 14.9%) to 32.0% 
(17.0%) in 1996 (previous Federal Republic); in 1997 the figure was 33.1% in Germany 
as a whole (18.9% in manufacturing industries). The percentage of employees with an 
apprenticeship/skilled worker qualification among total employees was 66.0% (manu-
facturing industries total 64.6%) in 1990 and 74.8% (69.9%) in 1996 (old FRG) and in 
1997 in Germany as a whole 75.6% (71.7%) (cf. Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung, 1999).  
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Thus in terms of investment in human resources there also appears to be no slowdown 
due to shifting priorities, at least not in aggregate statistics. 
Turning now to the company level, it should be stressed that only a small minority of 
companies in the car industry are publicly traded firms. As Table 1 shows, the total 
number of companies producing cars and car parts in Germany in 1996 was 3,695, of 
which 368 were producers of passenger cars and engines and 1,216 were suppliers of 
car and engine parts. Among the 3,695 car and car parts manufacturers, 24 were AGs 
(stock corporations) (0.6%) producing 84.1% of the total turnover (total turnover 1996: 
314 billion DM). Eight out of these 24 stock corporations where producers of passenger 
cars and engines. Their turnover made up almost 90% of the total turnover of the entire 
motor-vehicle industry. Thus listed companies dominate the industry in terms of turn-
over on the level of final assemblers; on the level of suppliers their share of total turn-
over is small (around 10% as an estimate).2 Of the total number of producers of motor 
vehicles and parts, stock corporations make up 0.6% of all companies (84.1% of total 
turnover); 49.1% are sole proprietorships (0,7% of total turnover), 6.7% are general 
commercial partnerships (0.5% of total turnover), 11.4% are limited commercial part-
nerships (7.3% of total turnover), 31.2% are limited liability companies (7% of total 
turnover), and 0.9% have other legal forms (0.0% of total turnover). 
It is obvious that the stock corporations in the passenger car segment are the industry’s 
centre of gravity. There are about 10 stock corporations in the supplier segment (exact 
number not disclosed by the Federal Statistical Office) with about 20% of total turnover 
of this segment. Thus, in this segment stock corporations do not predominate; limited 
commercial partnerships (37.5% of total turnover) and limited liability companies 
(39.6% of total turnover) are more important. The difference between the car maker and 
supplier segments and their legal forms corresponds with the traditional view of the 
industry: a small number of globally oriented lead manufacturers with a large number of 
family-owned SME suppliers huddled around them. However, this picture changed 
drastically in the 1990s. A wave of mergers and acquisitions has almost wiped out the 
traditional small and middle-sized suppliers; a considerable number of them has been 
taken over by foreign companies, in particular US-American.  
In terms of ownership and exposure to the capital market, all German car companies are 
still more or less firmly anchored in block ownership (main source for the following is 
Deutsche Informationsbörse: www.dib-ag.de, September 2000):  
Volkswagen: 
Different sources attribute an 18.6% (Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2001) or 14.29% share 
in Volkswagen to the state of Lower Saxony. According to Deutsche Informationsbörse, 
VW’s ownership structure in late September 2000 was:  
76.02% free float,  
14.29% Lower Saxony,  
4.41% Capital Growth Managed Limited,  
3.88% Janus Capital Corp.,  
1.40% Allianz. 
                                                 
2 Precise figures are not available due to anonymisation; cf. Table 1. 
– 6 – 
The calculation by Deutsche Informationsbörse seems to be based on the total number 
of shares, common and preference shares. Due to a share buy-back by VW in 2000 the 
share of Niedersachsen has increased to 20% again. As of the end of December 2000 
Volkswagen’s ownership structure is as follows: 20% State of Lower Saxony, 10.2% 
self-control led by VW, 12.1% national institutional investors, 3.5% other European 
institutional investors, 3% US institutional investors, and 51.4% floating capital (Share-
world-LEREPS, in Dupuy and Lung, 2001). 
DaimlerChrysler: 
In the case of Daimler Chrysler block ownership is around 19%, 11.6% is held by Deut-
sche Bank and 7.5% by Kuwaiti Sheiks. Other institutional investors hold 56% and 
small private shareholders hold the remaining 25%. 
BMW: 
BMW is still held by the Quandt family. According to Deutsche Informationsbörse the 
ownership structure is as follows:   
45.34% free float,  
15.53% Hanna Quandt,  
15.25% Stefan Quandt,  
11.62% Susanne Klatten,  
10.16% GFA Gesellschaft für Automobilwerte mbH,  
2.10% employees. 
Porsche: 
Finally, 55.0% of Porsche shares are held by the Porsche and Piëch families, leaving a 
free float of 45%. 
Ford (98%), Opel (100%) and Audi (100%) are fully owned subsidiaries of the parent 
corporations. 
The protection of the leading car assemblers by block ownership is not just a German 
phenomenon. In fact, the situation of a full exposure to the stock market in terms of 
floating capital holds true only for a minority of car makers – General Motors being the 
prominent example. Family, state or other block owner protections exist at Ford, at all 
Japanese and Korean car makers and most of the European car makers. Table 2 shows 
the ownership structure for four European flagship car makers Fiat, PSA, Renault and 
Volkswagen. The table shows that Fiat and PSA are to a large extent still family-
dominated companies, whereas Renault and VW are state-dominated companies. 
As we have seen, very few of the suppliers are listed, and stock-market flotations have 
been quite rare. Besides Volkswagen and Porsche as OEMs, only 15 automotive IPOs 
were registered between 1949 and 1999 in one of the stock exchange segments. No in-
crease in IPO intensity is apparent during the bubble period from 1997 to 2000: only 
four new automotive companies went public during that period.  
It has to be noted that a number of companies with a strong global market position and a 
record of high innovation intensity have the legal form of a foundation. The most 
prominent example is Bosch. 
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Table 2: Ownership Structure and Control of the 4 European Car Makers 
(December 31st, 2000) 
Car 
maker 
Family/State 
control 
Self-con-
trol (1) 
Traditional allies Institutional investors (2) Floating 
capital (3) 
   Industrial Financial Na-
tional 
Other 
European 
USA  
Fiat 21.3%  
(Agnelli 
family) 
 20% 
(General 
Motors) 
13% 3.3% 2.0% 2.5% 37.9% 
PSA 24.6% 
(Peugeot 
family) 
6.6% 5.35% 
(Michelin, 
Lafargue) 
6.5% 
(Société 
Générale, 
CDC) 
8.0% 5.3% 3.7% 40.0% 
Renault 44.2% 
(French 
State) 
4.9% 1.5% 
(La-
gardère) 
 11.3% 4.6% 4.9% 28.6% 
VW 20% 
(State of 
Nieder-
sachsen) 
10.2%   12.1% 3.5% 3.0% 51.4% 
(1) stakes owned by the company and by their salaries 
(2) except financial allies 
(3) shareholders not identified 
Source: Jürgens et al. (2002, p. 63) 
Fig. 1: The Development of Share Values (CDax Auto) vs. the Volume of 
Production Orders in the Car Industry 
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As we have mentioned automotive corporations did not profit from the 1997 – 2000 
stock market boom. As figure 1 shows, the CDax Auto developed negatively while Dax 
and Neuer Markt reached record highs especially between November 1999 and May 
2000.  
Obviously, shareholders considered the auto industry as old economy during this time. 
In terms of the average dividends paid by the auto industry as compared to the divi-
dends in other areas of the industry sector, this “discrimination” was not justified. As 
Table 3 shows, the vehicle industry paid above average dividends in 1998/99.  
The development of the CDax Auto versus the development of incoming orders i.e. bu-
siness opportunities of the auto industries, shows a decoupling occurring in 1999 with 
share values dropping steeply while the order volume continued at previous levels. 
Table 3: Average Dividends in the Vehicle Industry Compared to the Industrial 
Sector in Total Economy 1998 and 1999 
Dividend per 1 Euro share  Number of public 
listed companies 
Equity in million 
Euro 1998 1999 
Vehicle industry 16 7,538 0.41 0.41 
Industrial sector 356 34,184 0.28 0.30 
Total economy 849 67,493 0.27 0.29 
Source: Hoppenstedt: Aktienführer (2001, p. V6) 
Table 4: The Relationship between Market Value and Turnover  
of Selected Auto Companies (May 2001) 
Company Market Value* Turnover 
Toyota 153 73 
DaimlerChrysler 56 162 
Ford 55 180 
Honda 50 28 
General Motors 36 196 
Nissan 31 28 
BMW 26 35 
Volkswagen 20 85 
Peugeot 15 44 
Renault 13 40 
* Figures in billion Euro, Stand: 25. Mai 2001 
Source: Bloomberg (Capital 31.5.2001) 
This development meant that German car companies became very cheap on the market 
place. Thus by the end of May 2000 Nokia was worth 260 billion Euro, almost three 
times as much as Germany’s Big Three car makers were worth at the time: 92 billion 
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Euro (DaimlerChrysler 58.3 billion, Volkswagen AG 13.4 billion and BMW 20.3 bil-
lion Euro) at this date. Thus the prospect of a hostile takeover, in particular by “finan-
cial raiders” seemed not unrealistic. 
Volkswagen was in a particularly weak position among the auto companies if one con-
siders the relationship between market value and turnover, as can be seen from Table 4. 
Thus the stages set now for the following case study on the experience at Volkswagen 
adopting shareholder value principles in its company policy. 
3. Case Study Volkswagen 
3.1 The Traditional Corporate Governance System of Volkswagen 
in a Historical Perspective3 
Volkswagen’s governance structure has often been discussed as an example of German 
neo-corporatism. Here it is important to briefly analyse the founding of the company 
and its relations with shareholders. The Volkswagen works were run as a state company 
after the British allied force withdrew in 1949. In 1960 Volkswagen Works Limited 
became a stock corporation (AG) and was partially privatised. State institutions now 
held 40% of the shares, with the state of Lower Saxony and the German Federal Gov-
ernment each holding 20%. The remaining shares were widely spread among banks and 
insurance companies and private shareholders, many of whom were Volkswagen em-
ployees. As a consequence, governmental representatives remained a dominating influ-
ence on the supervisory board, the body that determined long term strategies and per-
sonnel selection for the executive board. Traditionally, these representatives were the 
ministers of finance and of economic affairs, and sometimes the minister of social and 
labour affairs. In periods when both Lower Saxony and the Federal Republic were gov-
erned by Social Democrat majorities – this was the case in the 1970s –, and since 1990 
up until today, labour-oriented (state and union) representatives have made up the ma-
jority of Volkswagen’s supervisory board. 
Governmental influence on VW remained strong, even after 1988 when the federal gov-
ernment sold its Volkswagen shares, since the Lower Saxony government remained the 
single most important shareholder. Hence the composition of the 20-strong supervisory 
board in 2000 was as follows. On the side of labour: three representatives of IG Metall 
(among them the leader of IG Metall as deputy chairman of the board) and six represen-
tatives of Volkswagen’s works council; on the side of capital, four representatives from 
other companies (among them the chairman of the board), three persons representing 
banks and a shareholder association, and two representatives of Lower Saxony, among 
them the prime minister of the current Social Democratic government. In principle this 
composition of the supervisory board has not changed much since the company went 
public in 1960.  
                                                 
3  This section draws from a study of the author on VW in the context of the Gerpisa programme on 
industrial models (cf. Jürgens 1998). 
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The distinctiveness of VW’s governance structure is based on a special law, the “VW 
Act” enacted in 1960 when Volkswagen was privatised, and a corresponding company 
statute. On this basis the state of Lower Saxony has guaranteed status as the dominant 
share owner. Important clauses of the VW law of 1960 and the corresponding company 
statute:  
– Any increase in shareholder ownership beyond 20% of total shares does not lead to 
further voting rights; this holds true also for indirectly controlled shares or attempts 
of share pooling; in this way Lower Saxony with its 20% share ownership could not 
be outvoted by another block owner. In addition, the state owners where guaranteed 
the right to fill two positions in the supervisory board. 
– Decisions on new plants or plant relocation require a two-third majority on the su-
pervisory board. In this way government and labour representatives could hardly be 
overruled in decisions concerning changes of location and employment security. 
– The VW act requires banks to receive authorization for proxy voting from each 
shareholder in advance of each general shareholder assembly. In view of the efforts 
this would have required banks never attained the same degree of proxy voting 
power at VW as they had in other German companies.4 
Various political initiatives had been taken in the past to abolish the VW Act. Allegedly 
by request of a German Bank, the EU has been scrutinizing the legal situation in 
2000/01 and has already declared it is an impediment to free capital flow within the EU. 
In any case, the protection the VW act provides for Volkswagen up to now cannot be 
taken for granted any longer in the future. 
Concerning union influence, the chairman of IG Metall traditionally has been a member 
of Volkswagen’s supervisory board. The chairmen of the works councils of most of 
VW’s German plants were also members of the board. Thus, labour’s standpoint was 
always strongly represented on the board and greatly influenced the selection of the 
chief officers who ran the company. This influence was only strengthened when in 1976 
a law was passed to extend the system of co-determination in supervisory boards to all 
companies with a certain minimum number of employees. 
In any case, union relations at Volkswagen are characterized by a high degree of “joint-
ness” between management and works councils in company policy, which exceed the 
formal co-determination framework of industrial relations in Germany. The foundations 
of this partnership were laid in the early post-war period when the works council system 
was given strong support by the British allied command. The partnership developed 
over the decades, not least of all owing to the long and continuous reign of both the first 
German chief executive, Nordhoff, and the leader of the works council, Bork. Nordhoff, 
a manager at General Motors German Operations before the war, held his position from 
1949 to 1968, and Bork, who was the first IG Metall candidate to win the top position in 
the works council system, held this position from 1951 until 1971. As a Social Democ-
rat, he was also mayor of the city of Wolfsburg during the 1960s and early 1970s. Close 
co-operation between management and works council and the vision of a happy “VW 
                                                 
4 Many shareholders do not authorize banks to represent their votes. As a consequence only a lim-
ited number of votes is present and represented on VW’s general shareholder assemblies. Thus on 
the last assembly of June 2001 only 36.6% of votes were present and so the land of Lower Saxony 
had the majority of almost 55% of the votes on this assembly. 
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family” fostered by Nordhoff did not reduce the influence of IG Metall. On the con-
trary, IG Metall obviously profited from this configuration. Its influence grew slowly 
from a rather low level especially among white collar employees in the early 1950s. It 
did not achieve a clear majority in works council elections before 1955, and it was not 
until 1967 that individual IG Metall membership reached the 50% mark (Koch, 1987, 
p. 5). The gradual strengthening of IG Metall’s influence among white collar employees 
continued until the 1980s when it stabilized at a high level. In 1995 about 96% of em-
ployees at VW’s main location, the Wolfsburg plant, including almost 90% of white 
collar employees, were members of IG Metall. It was therefore hardly surprising that IG 
Metall candidates regularly get the lion’s share in works council elections. Thus, strong 
union influence and a strong position for the works councils turned out to be comple-
mentary and self-reinforcing characteristics of VW’s system. Its stability was further 
strengthened by the long spells of continuous leadership. The position of the chief 
works council representative was held by four persons through the years from 1951 to 
2001. During this time the company had six chief executives on the management side. 
The long periods of continuity and at times close personal relationship helped to solve 
problems in many cases before they could turn into conflicts or even threaten industrial 
peace. The influence of the works council at VW has often been cited as an example of 
“co-management”. The flip-side of the strong role of the works councils in the system 
was that it worked against initiatives that might be taken among rank and file employees 
and did not support any evolution towards direct participation and grass roots activities 
on the shop floor (cf. Koch, 1987). 
These elements remained central to the industrial model as it evolved into the mid-
1990s. A pre-requisite of its stability was the fact that no major changes in the political 
regulatory environment took place during this period. We refer here to the constitutive 
elements of the West German neo-corporatist system, particularly to the system of co-
determination. The system is sufficiently independent of party platforms and alliances 
not to be attributable to Social Democracy alone. Conservative governments also sup-
ported this structure. Of particular relevance in this regard was the system of co-
determination. It was based on the influence of works councils exercised through 
elected officials representing blue – and white – collar interests at different levels within 
the company. The Industrial Constitution Act of 1952 (with major revisions 1972) gave 
the works council varying levels of influence, depending on the subject matter, extend-
ing from the right to information concerning economic data and business performance, 
to the right to consultation, and the right of co-determination – that is the right to veto 
certain measures proposed by management. Plant agreements between management and 
the works councils further extend the influence of the elected counsellors in defining 
work organization, the introduction of new technology, training, and other matters. 
Through their legally mandated representation on company boards, the delegates from 
the union and the works councils can, under certain conditions, exert strong influence 
on the appointment of the executive board and on strategic company decisions.  
Collective bargaining takes place between national unions and employer associations 
with collective agreements reached on a regional level encompassing the whole range of 
metal related industries, and not just the automotive industry. Volkswagen is an unusual 
case in this regard, however. As it did not become a member of the employer associa-
tion “Gesamtmetall”, collective agreements have to be negotiated directly with the un-
ion, IG Metall. As a consequence, Volkswagen became a unique case of a company-
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wide collective bargaining system. At VW the “dual system” of industrial relations in 
Germany – in which the union concludes general agreements on wages and salaries, and 
the works councils at the plant level deal with the details of wage differentiation, work-
ing conditions and grievances – was therefore “short circuited” to a certain degree. 
The year 1967 marked the beginning of a crisis in the post-war model at VW. The re-
cession demonstrated the vulnerability of VW’s product strategy. The decrease in de-
mand in Germany affected VW more than other car manufacturers. Costs became an 
issue for the first time. It became evident that product differentiation had its price when 
even a slight deviation from the standard product required a separate process and work 
organization. Thus labour costs also became an issue for the first time after the boom 
years. After sales had picked up again in 1968 the dependency on the Beetle remained. 
None of the new car models (the 1500/1600 and 411/412 series) became a success in the 
market place. In America the criticism of the Beetle as an unsafe car by Ralph Nader 
and the consumer movement and the strong revaluation of the D-Mark against the Dol-
lar after the end of the Bretton Woods system made prospects ever bleaker. The various 
interest groups represented in VW’s governance structure were unable to reach consen-
sus on building a plant in the United States, a plan which had been on the agenda since 
the mid 1950s. 
VW’s governance structure played a decisive role in this critical period. Close co-
operation between management and the works council was an essential ingredient of 
Volkswagen’s industrial model. The neo-corporatist governance structure resulting 
from the specific history and ownership of Volkswagen helped to reconfirm this rela-
tionship. This was the basis for a new phase of jointness in its future-oriented strategies.  
The company fared well in most of its major markets (except North America) during 
much of this period from the late 1970s to the 1980s). The second oil crisis, which was 
strongly felt by many companies in North America and Europe, had little impact on 
Volkswagen. The company now profited from strong sales of its product range espe-
cially in Europe. This was the period in which Volkswagen gained its position as 
Europe’s largest automobile company, when it bought SEAT and started its activities in 
China. Sales increased almost threefold within a decade and an expansionist mood took 
root.  
A closer look at the figures reveals that the increase in sales by value was in fact much 
higher than the increase in output volume. Volkswagen in particular benefited from a 
market trend towards more expensive model variants during the 1980s as customers 
tended to move up the product range. A continuous increase in value/price per unit 
lasted into the 1990s. Growth seems to have taken another path, not by volume but by 
value. This brings us to the centre of what came to be regarded as the basis of the “Ger-
man model”, or “the strategy of diversified quality production”. According to Sorge and 
Streeck, countries with the highest wage costs and with strong unions and workers’ in-
terest representation like Germany and Sweden adopted this strategy and fared better 
than countries like the United States and the United Kingdom which instead sought 
competitiveness through low costs. “Diversified quality production” was said to 
respond flexibly to consumer desires and take advantage of the market trend towards 
higher quality products and customisation. Flexible production technology, a high skill 
level and an “intelligent” form of work organization were prerequisites for such a strat-
egy (Streeck, 1989; Sorge and Streeck, 1988). Thus the adoption of diversified quality 
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production can bee seen as a validation of the effectiveness of the German system of co-
determination, humanization of work and centralized collective bargaining in securing 
growth and employment. 
This “German model” approach seemed to open up an alternative to the low-cost strat-
egy of catching up with the Japanese. It stood in perfect harmony with West Germany’s 
“ingrained social and productive principles” (Boyer/Freyssenet 1995). 
Post-war records in sales were achieved in 1992. Yet in the second half of 1992, sales 
and order volumes began to decline and the economic recession reached Volkswagen. 
The company entered another stage of acute crisis. The group made a record net loss of 
almost DM 2 billion in 1993. VW’s fundamental weakness had become apparent the 
year before. While sales had increased by about 12% for the group (likewise for the VW 
AG) the economic result was negative and profits plummeted by 87% (70% for the VW 
AG). The organization was shaken to the core and its underlying industrial model again 
entered a trial by fire. 
As 20 years before, the new crisis resulted from the coincidence of corporate govern-
ance problems and market problems. And as in 1974 the supervisory board sought a 
solution by appointing new chief executive manager. The choice fell on Piëch, the 
grandson of the father of the Beetle, Porsche. Piëch had been chief executive at Audi. In 
this role he was a controversial figure, autocratic in his management style and techno-
cratic in his product conception. His appointment was widely regarded as a decision in 
favour of a policy of re-establishing profitability and focusing on the core business of 
auto production in the classical sense. 
Once again the importance of the governance structure and its embeddedness in the 
German political economy was demonstrated. As far as what the name Piëch stood for, 
it was by no means self-evident that the representatives of labour, the head of IG Metall 
and the leading works council representatives, and the Lower Saxony prime minister – a 
Social Democrat, would opt for Piëch. Obviously they saw the need for a tough policy 
of rationalization and a return to profitability. The hiring of Lopez from General Motors 
together with the forced exit of most of the executive boards’ old guard demonstrated 
Piech’s determination to shake off “path dependencies” rooted in the fiefdoms of the 
past. 
Piëch’s term as head of the executive board formally was until the end of 2002. By his 
own decision he set the date of April 2002. By surprise action the nomination of his 
successor was taken early in September 2001. The reason for this early decision is re-
lated to the topic of this paper, and the way how this decision was taken is very instruc-
tive of the changes and continuities of Volkswagen’s corporate governance system. We 
will come back to this at the end of this paper. 
In sum, Volkswagen clearly has a distinctive corporate governance system with the spe-
cial form of co-determination as the central element. It is a prime example of what has 
been called “co-management” by industrial relations researchers. In a recent brochure 
published by the central and corporate works council of the Volkswagen AG this sys-
tem is referred to as “cooperative coping with conflicts based on four pillars: 1. a high 
degree of union membership, 2. top management committed to the goals of social re-
sponsibility and competitivity, 3. a priority on location and employment interests and 4. 
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a company-based bargaining system between IG Metall and the Executive Board of the 
Volkswagen AG.” (Gesamt- und Konzernbetriebsrat der Volkswagen AG) 
3.2 Changes of VW’s Corporate Governance Towards a 
Shareholder-Value Orientation 
Accepting shareholder-value principles has been a process driven by the top manage-
ment of the company. In view of the dismal record of profitability of the company, 
Piëch after taking the position of the head of the executive board5 in 1993 stressed the 
need for profitability. Responding to critiques by investors he declared his commitment 
to realize a return of sales target of 8% “in the mid-term”. This target later on was re-
duced to 6.5% and was complemented by a return on capital target. Since 1998 Piëch 
has taken these targets more and more seriously, linking their achievement to the last 
year before his retirement (set for April 2002). With his well-known autocratic man-
agement style there was no doubt that adopting and adapting to this goal was a “must” 
for the company. In this way achieving the financial and profitability goals was pushed 
through with the same vigour by Piëch in his final years, as his productionist goals for 
improving product quality in the first half of his reign.  
Clearly shareholder-value orientation has gained momentum within the company. Two 
events which played a major role in fostering this reorientation, should be mentioned: 
One is the failed attempt to increase capital in 1997. This capital increase aimed at pro-
viding the company with M&A funds for its expansion plans – the names of Scania and 
BMW were rumoured to be targets – VW met the resistance of capital investors who 
demanded more concrete details about its M&A measures which Piëch refused to offer. 
The new share issue had to be cancelled. The second event was the Mannesmann case, 
the acquisition of one of the German flagship companies by a hitherto almost unknown 
British telecommunication company. The fear of a hostile takeover became an issue on 
which management and works councils were united. With a market value of 15 billion 
Euro Volkswagen seemed an easy prey for any group of investors – if it had not been 
for the blocking stake of the Lower Saxony government. The Mannesmann case was 
seen as the writing on the wall. Although Volkswagen was at the forefront of those who 
lobbied against the takeover directive proposed by the EU (and did so successfully), it 
was obvious that it could not rely on state government protection forever. 
In 2000 a number of measures were taken by Volkswagen to step up “efforts to enhance 
communication with its investors”, states VW’s annual report 2000. The following mea-
sures are listed:  
– Enhancing relations with institutional investors and analysts and with private inves-
tors. Thus, among others, over 100 one-to-one meetings were held to explain corpo-
rate strategy and to answer questions from financial analysts and investors. The in-
                                                 
5 It would be misleading to call the head of a German company (Vorstandsvorsitzender) a CEO. 
The members of the executive boards under German law have a collective responsibility with the 
head of the board more or less playing a “speakers’ role”.  
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vestor relations function was restructured and an office was established in London to 
promote contexts with international financial analysts. 
– A share buy back scheme was launched in September 2000. VW acquired ordinary 
share amounting to 9.8% of the share capital. As a consequence Volkswagen’s share 
outperformed the CDax Automotive Index and the Dax. (In 2001 management 
achieved authorization from the general shareholder meeting for a second share buy-
back of 10% to be realized after the first share quantum had been used.) 
– The company stated its commitment to support the OECD principles on corporate 
governance adopted in 1999 (ibid., p. 12). In a rather vague formulation the report 
continues: “We are investigating implementation of the farther-reaching criteria un-
der discussion based on an analysis of the Company’s situation.” (ibid.) 
– The adoption of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) instead of the tradi-
tional German Commercial Code (HGB) standards. 
– The adoption of segmental reporting in the 2000 annual report for the first time. 
As of now, these measures have failed to impress financial analysts. “The one great 
weakness of the company from an investor’s perspective is that it really has been a bas-
tion of German traditional accounting and disclosure,” is a statement of one of them 
quoted by the journal “Investor Relations” (1.6.2001). “Volkswagen is Europe’s least 
transparent car maker,” another investor is quoted, and in the context of the critique of 
the investor community against preference shares at Volkswagen, a German funds man-
ager complained: “VW is kind of a socialist company, it’s getting harder and harder to 
see why VW shares should be held at all.” (Wall Street Journal Europe, 8.6.2001) 
The concept of “workholder value” developed by Volkswagen’s labour director in 1999 
showed the uneasiness felt by company management and the search for a compromise. 
According to this concept, personnel policy should combine two sets of goals in the 
future. One is workholder value with social responsibility, knowledge management, 
employability and flexibility as central elements; the other is shareholder value aiming 
to increase company value, improve results, value added per employee and yield. 
“Shareholder Value”, according to a company personnel manager at a conference in 
May 2000, “has an outstanding influence on the development of the company. Twenty-
four hours a day companies are analysed, evaluated, rewarded, or graded for their deci-
sions, successes, and the expectations they raise. In future, corporate governance will 
require keeping up in this great race while nevertheless keeping one’s mind clear for 
long term goals and societal obligations … However, shareholder value reflects the po-
tential of a company only to a limited degree. The difference between market value and 
equity is often explained in terms of human capital. It is this human capital that decides 
the future prospects of a company. … For us Volkswagen’s corporate success is defined 
not only in terms of shareholder value, of its value as a going concern, but equally in 
terms of workholder value, which the workforce generates through their work and their 
know-how.”  
The combination of shareholder and workholder values is to be realized by the “Volks-
wagen Corporate Concept” characterized by specific employment concepts, a variable 
remuneration system and by the “M4-employee” (Menschlich – human, Mobil – mobile, 
Mehrfachqualifiziert – multi-skilled, Mitgestaltend – participatory). “More than in the 
past we will discover management and workforce as the real value leverage of the com-
– 16 – 
pany. The workforce support shareholder value and the imagination of the sharehold-
ers.” (unpublished manuscript, April 2000) 
Although the workholder value concept was not given a high profile in these public 
relations activities, internally at VW it certainly reflected a wide-spread consensus. In 
any case shareholder value has not officially become the lead orientation for the com-
pany. However, pressure in this direction has increased in recent years. 
The works council observes that the capital side on the supervisory board does indeed 
ask more intensively about performance on the capital market. Despite all the criticism 
of VW as a “socialist state enterprise”, VW’s success on the market place has in the 
past calmed everyone down. Without this success conflicts would certainly have be-
come more intense. 
Has Volkswagen then really adopted shareholder value as a primary goal or is it only lip 
serving the financial community? 
3.3 The Role of the Stock Market for Company Financing 
At Volkswagen the stock market only since very recently has been regarded as impor-
tant for company policy. On the rare events when in the past the company increased its 
equity base, all measures were taken to maintain the existing ownership structure. In the 
past capital intake from the stock market was in most cased linked to major acquisi-
tions. This was the case in 1965 when Volkswagen bought Audi Union from Daimler 
Benz and increased its capital by 150 million DM (from the 1960 IPO base of 600 mil-
lion DM).6 This capital increase was financed out of the undisclosed reserve of VW 
itself and passed over to the existing owners. The next increase 1970 was related to the 
leap in investments required for the next generation of models after the Beetle. In 1977 
300 million DM of shares were issued in the context of investment in the new US site at 
Westmoreland and the purchase of Triumph-Adler. 1986 another 300 million DM were 
added in view of the acquisition of Seat. At this point Volkswagen decided to introduce 
preference shares. The reason might have been that Lower Saxony at this time had a 
conservative government which might have opted not to follow the increase in capital. 
In this way VW could mobilise new capital without affecting the existing ownership 
structure. During the 1990s at several times new preference shares were issued. In 2000 
preference shares made up one fourth of total shares. 1990 also saw an increase in 
common shares (by 12.5%) necessary, obviously in view of the full acquisition of Seat 
and 30% of Škoda to be raised stepwise up to 70% in 1994 and 1995. In the second half 
of the 1990s under the reign of Piëch, new shares, either common or preference shares, 
were issued almost every second year, however in small amounts (an increase of 22% of 
the equity base altogether between 1995 and 2000). 
The stated policy of the company is to finance investments and regular operations out of 
the cash flow. Considering the development of cash flow as percentage of capital in-
vestments in tangible fixed assets during the 1990s for the Volkswagen Group this did 
not pose a problem (cf. Table 5). For the automotive business (since recently the Annual 
                                                 
6 The reference in the following account is nominal capital, not the market value. 
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Reports have provided the data for the business areas “automobile” and “financial ser-
vices”) investments exceeded cash flow slightly in the years 1996 and 1997, they were 
hardly covered by the cash flow in 1998 and 1999 before in 2000 cash flow exceeded 
investment again by a comfortable margin (of 22%). 
While the automobile business could largely be financed out of the cash flow, the ex-
pansion of the finance service business required a more frequent interchange with the 
capital markets. It led to a diversification of the means of re-financing. Already in 1977 
Volkswagen International Finance was founded as a subsidiary – now part of the fi-
nancing division – “in order to source finance for the Group at favourable terms world-
wide on international capital markets. The company makes use of primary and deriva-
tive financial instruments.” (Volkswagen Annual Report, 2000: 75) An analysis of the 
changes in Volkswagen’s liability structure shows an increased importance of bonds 
(increased by 69% from 1995 to 2000), of credits from banks (+31%), but most impor-
tantly re-financing occurred through a commercial paper programme and a multi-
currency Euro medium-term note (EMTN) programme as well as through company-
internal loans. 
Table 5: Cash flow and Capital Investments in Tangible Fixed Assets at VW, 
1991-2000 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cash flow as % of 
capital investments 
in tangible fixed 
assets 
137.8 150.5 224.7 294.0 234.6 152.8 149.5 143.2 171.0 209.8 
VW AG automo-
tive division 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 137.5  99.7  92.7 102.3 102.9 122.2 
Source: Volkswagen AG, Annual Reports 
In any case, refinancing has become a major concern for the company. Obviously it 
perceives increasing difficulties of refinancing itself through banks. “The intensified 
efforts of the banks to improve their equity yield”, VW states in its Annual Report, 
“combined with the ongoing global process of consolidation in the banking industry, 
meant that banks where increasingly reluctant to provide additional credit lines at the 
previously applicable terms during the period under review. The trend, again some 
years ago, toward the use of international capital markets with the establishment of 
short- and medium-term tap issue programmes gained further momentum in the period 
under review, and made a major contribution to the Group’s liquidity. Automotive and 
Financial Services division companies have continued to utilise the capital markets with 
regular issues of commercial paper and medium-term notes, and have established them-
selves as respected market players in the eyes of investors and of the banks.” (Volks-
wagen Annual Report, 2000: 35) 
The special attention the company has paid to stock market development in recent times 
is clearly linked to its acquisition policy and its concern about a hostile take-over. And 
it is in this context when Volkswagen realised that it had a serious problem in its 
relationship with investors. This became evident in 1997 when the company had 
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tionship with investors. This became evident in 1997 when the company had decided to 
increase its nominal capital by 300 million DM. The intention was to offer half of this 
amount to its shareholders (first tranche) and the other half to national and international 
investors (second tranche). The company refused however to explain its strategy. Ac-
cording to rumours Volkswagen planned major acquisitions – BMW and Scania were 
among the household names mentioned in this context. The investor community reacted 
critically leaving Volkswagen in an embarrassing situation. The company decided to 
postpone the issue and in the following year it decided to go on with the issue of the 
first tranche and cancel the second. This negative experience of VW with investors on 
the stock market can be seen as a major explanation for the change in mind set in the 
company and the growth of awareness that the company had to improve its investor 
relations.  
At the same time when VW discovered the usefulness of the stock market to provide 
“acquisition money” it became aware of its own weakness as target for hostile take-
overs. Rumours of Ford being interested in acquiring Volkswagen, the EU Wettbewerb-
skommissar scrutinising the VW-law and the low market capitalisation of the Volks-
wagen – all this contributed to a rising fear of a hostile take-over which almost became 
the phobia in 2000/2001. With authorisation of the 2000 general shareholder meeting 
Volkswagen had bought back 10% of its shares already and the 2001 general assembly 
again authorised another share buy-back. While Volkswagen is not allowed to hold 
more than 10% of its own shares under self-control it could exchange these shares with 
“friendly” companies (Deutsche Post and Thyssen-Krupp were mentioned as such pos-
sible partners), then buy another 10% and use it in the same manner. In 2001 various 
possibilities to build a protection wall around Volkswagen were played through with the 
help of consultants. Together with the share block of Lower Saxony (20%), the cross 
shareholdings held with other companies could efficiently block off any hostile take-
over attempt. 
3.4 Changes in the Incentive System 
The question addressed in this section is whether this reorientation towards shareholder 
value is supported by a system of incentives. If targets are not reached, are there any 
monetary sanctions? How are stock option programs designed in view of stock market 
performance? 
While stock options in the past have played a small role, bonuses have played a role 
particularly for the higher ranking management. At the executive board level the pro-
portion of variable income is more than 50% of total salary. It is about 50% at the sec-
ond level and decreases down the hierarchy to 25% for those eligible for these bonuses. 
Bonuses are paid for white-collar employees not subject to collective agreements. The 
bonus is determined on the basis of the adjusted company earnings at the brand level. 
There is no differentiation according to different business units within the brands. The 
bonuses have three elements, first a company-related part differentiated according to 
hierarchical levels, second according to individual performance on the basis of person-
nel appraisal, and third stock options. 
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In any case, tying bonuses to performance targets requires a detailed area-specific plan-
ning and a controlling system which does not exist except for a few pilot areas. There 
are also no specific performance-oriented guidelines for personnel appraisal systems. 
Rough criteria are entrepreneurial, functional and social competence. It is the decision 
of management in the different business areas to use individual goal agreements. At the 
Wolfsburg plant a pilot experiment is being conducted for the group of first-level su-
pervisors. Monetary and career advancement over the three levels of supervisor posi-
tions was rare and thus little performance incentive existed for this group, which tradi-
tionally has a crucial function on the shop floor in German manufacturing companies.  
Bonuses are also paid at the level of employees subject to collective agreements, but not 
linked to targets/performance. 
With the introduction of the 28.8 hour week and the corresponding reduction of wages, 
a new system was introduced with three types of bonuses for employees subject to col-
lective agreements: first the minimum bonus (the rest of the former Christmas and holi-
day bonuses), second a performance bonus with overtime and extra shift work compo-
nents and which is thus not really performance-based, and, third, a company perform-
ance bonus partially paid in the form of “time asset” papers. 
The “time asset” scheme was introduced in 1998. It relates to the “workholder value” 
concept. The strategic aim is to combine the goals of employment protection and result 
orientation. In early 2001 450 million DM were invested in “time asset” papers, around 
100 million DM of which result from collective agreements. The balance was paid on 
an individual voluntary basis out of bonus payments, overtime payments, or premiums 
for improvement suggestions. As they are not subject to income tax and social security 
contributions at the time of payment, it is a very attractive savings system. “Time mo-
ney” invested in this asset is administered by special capital funds which, according to 
the 2000 annual report, have yielded an average return since they were created at the 
beginning of 1997 of approximately 8,7% p.a. The company expects that savings on the 
time account will be used by employees later to finance temporary old-age work time 
schemes or early retirement.  
Building on the experience with the time asset, the company pension scheme was re-
structured in early 2001. A pension fund administered jointly by management and 
works council was set up to finance new vested pension rights of employees in the fu-
ture. In this way employees shall benefit from the growth of the capital market and the 
company shall reduce its liabilities for future company pensions. 
The first stock option plan was introduced in 1999 (a previous plan decided in 1997 was 
stalled by litigation). Its main feature is that it is also open to ordinary blue and white 
collar employees. Subscription is differentiated according to three groups: 1. wage and 
salary earners subject to collective agreements, 2. salary earners and management not 
subject to collective agreements below top management, 3. top management (the latter 
comprises about 100 persons). Employees of the first group can subscribe for ten op-
tions, the second for 100 options, and the third for 1,000 options. Each option gives the 
right to buy 10 shares. The subscription of stock options presupposes that the employee 
also subscribes for time asset papers. For each option he has to have 100 DM on his 
time asset paper account. Thus the time asset scheme is bolstered by means of the share 
option plan.  
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For tax reasons the “time asset” paper is in particular advantageous for managers. They 
are made more attractive by linkage to the stock option schemes. The time asset scheme 
can thus also help to solve problems of retaining personnel.  
Despite the long experience at VW with employee share ownership and despite the fact 
that there is no risk involved in investing in a stock option, only 48.5% of ordinary em-
ployees (covered by collective agreements) participated in the first year in contrast to 
81.8% of middle management and higher-level salaried employees not covered by 
agreements (außertarifliche Angestellte) and 95.4% of top management. In the year af-
ter 51% of ordinary employees participated in the second tranche, in contrast to 77.3% 
of middle managers and higher level salaried employees and 91.4% of top management. 
This low participation is noted with some embarrassment by the protagonists of the 
stock option program. Besides the fact that the original conversion price was set too low 
in the first year, a lack of awareness and interest in the topic and mistrust about the 
goals of the company were named as explanations for this reluctance. 
Altogether the measures introduced by VW reveal an endeavour to combine finance 
market considerations with elements of employment protection and company considera-
tions aiming at greater personnel flexibility and lower short-term liabilities (overtime 
pay, pension liabilities).  
There are no specific stock option schemes for specific groups of employees such as IT 
specialists. However, stock option considerations played a role in plans to list Gedas, 
the IT company and 100% subsidiary of VW. The planned IPO has been postponed 
however due to the situation on the stock markets. 
3.5 Towards a Finance-oriented System of Target Setting and 
Controlling 
As a consequence of the crisis in the early 1990s, the company board took the initiative 
in 1993 to increase profitability in the company. This initiative was fully supported by 
the works council. Financial targets were set that focused on returns on sales and sales 
growth figures to be attained in a number of years. The head of the executive board 
committed himself to reaching these goals before he retired, i.e. 2002. The more recent 
measures to introduce a results-oriented controlling system within the company is seen 
as his attempt to deliver on this commitment. 
As of the beginning of 2000, VW has started to shift from a budget system to a results-
oriented system. Traditionally, targets are determined in the yearly “planning rounds” 
which take place in November each year. Among other things, the planning round 49 
(2000) decided: 
Financial targets: 
– Return on capital should be within a corridor between 9% and 11%; 
– break-even of max. 60%; 
– return on sales should reach 4.7% and increase to 6.5% by 2005; 
– investments should be paid out of the cash flow and have a cap of DM 6 billion. 
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Besides this, various performance targets were set, such as material price reduction of 
2%, fixed cost reduction of 3%, etc. 
The new system of financial control at Volkswagen was announced in January 2000 and 
is based on capital costs and return on capital as target indicators, with the aim of meas-
uring in detail the success of the individual brands and regions of the group, and also of 
the different products and projects. The previous system at VW was based on return on 
sales, with sales and earnings before taxes as central targets. It did not give information 
about whether capital employed – from the viewpoint of the investor – yielded an ade-
quate return. The future system takes into account capital market expectations of a mi-
nimum return on invested capital. According to a company-internal brochure, the 
purpose of the revision is to allow a value-based control system serving the interests of 
all stakeholders. In the preamble Piëch and Adelt (VW’s CFO) explain the purpose of 
this new system in a manner which can be seen as a typical example of fine-balancing 
stakeholder interests: “In order to be successful also on the capital market we have to 
increase our market value by continuously improving our profitability. Only in this way 
we will make the company attractive to capital investors and make sure that we have the 
financial leeway to finance our future projects and our innovation also via the capital 
market. Investments and innovation at the same time ensure the long-term stability of 
employment.” (Finanzielle Steuerungsgrößen des Volkswagen-Konzerns, 2000) 
At the current stage the targets based on return on capital employed/return on invest-
ment are not differentiated according to different business units and group companies, 
with the exception of targets related to certain country affiliates. While they are the sa-
me for European countries, they are higher for countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South 
Africa and China owing to higher investment risks or capital costs in these countries.  
The implementation of the new system is in its early stages. There are only a few cases 
where the result-oriented controlling system is already being practiced. In Wolfsburg it 
was introduced in an area producing trim parts which is threatened by outsourcing. The 
reason for introducing the new system is explicitly to enable this area to become com-
petitive and remain an in-house supplier. Another example is the Brunswick component 
plant which among others produces axles and parts of the steering system. This focus on 
component production areas is no accident. Currently, component production is an inte-
gral part of the Volkswagen production and industrial relations system. Due to strong 
competition on the supplier market, these internal suppliers would not be able to meet 
the financial targets. Either different targets would be set for different business units 
corresponding with their different market situations, or business units such as compo-
nent production would be singled out as systemic underperformers and come under 
pressure for outsourcing. This is the perspective obvious to all protagonists. A solution 
proposed by the works council is to set targets for internal suppliers in relation to the 
reference group of competing suppliers. 
Table 6 shows the return on sales of VW’s brands. It shows the high variance with each 
segment seemingly on a different level/trajectory. A uniform target does not seem to 
make much sense under these conditions. It is, by the way, the first segmented account 
of performance results in VW’s annual reports. 
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Since 2000, the Volkswagen group has been split into three divisions: The automotive 
division; financial services; and financing division (cf. for the following Volkswagen’s 
Annual Report 2000). 
The automotive division is structured by brands and regions: Volkswagen passenger 
cars, Volkswagen commercial vehicles, Audi, Seat, Škoda, Rolls-Royce/Bentley as 
brands which report separately; the two remaining brands, Lamborghini and Bugatti, 
report under Audi resp. VW passenger cars; and the regions: North America, South 
America and Asia Pacific. Table 6 shows the differences of returns between the brands 
and regions with VW commercial vehicles leading the profitability league followed by 
Audi in terms of the brands and with Asia Pacific leading the regional league followed 
by North America. 
Table 6: Return on Sales of VW’s Brands and Investment and Financial 
Planning of the VW Group Automotive Division (DM billion) 
Return on Sales of VW’s Brands Investment and Financial Planning of the 
VW Group Automotive Division  
(DM billion) 
 2000 1999 2001-2005 
   Capital investments 
in tangible assets 
(1) 
Cash 
flow 
(2) 
(2):(1) 
in % 
Volkswagen passenger cars 3.6 3.1 26.3 (42.6) 42.6 161.9 
Volkswagen commercial vehicles 5.7 5.7 3.8 (6.1) 4.6 121.1 
Audi 4.8 4.7 14.5 (23.5) 23.7 163.4 
Seat 2.4 2.3 3.0 (4.9) 5.4 180.0 
Škoda 2.7 2.9 3.9 (6.3) 5.5 141.0 
Rolls Royce/Bentley -38.4 -84.7 0.7 (1.1) 1.2 171.4 
North America region 4.4 3.2 5.0 (8.1) 8.4 168.0 
South America region -0.1 -7.1 4.4 (7.1) 5.6 127.3 
Asia-Pacific region 7.4 7.7 0.2 (0.3) 0.5 250.0 
Financial service division 10.1 4.2     
Source: Volkswagen Annual Report 2000 
The financial services division handles dealer and customer finance and leasing opera-
tions for the VW Group. It also operates fleet management services, agency business for 
insurance and commercial papers as well as savings accounts. With effect from January 
1, 2000 the division incorporates the group’s car rental business (the Europcar group) 
and insurance business (Volkswagen-Versicherungsdienst GmbH). Banking and leasing 
operations have been growing fast in recent years: balance-sheet total from 
59,618 million DM in 1999 to 74,897 million DM in 2000, capital investments in leas-
ing and rental assets from 13,575 million DM in 1999 to 22,700 million DM in 2000; 
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the workforce from 4,200 in 1999 to 10,100 in 2000. 27.3% of all vehicles delivered by 
the group were leased or financed in 2000. Direct banking business expanded with di-
rect bank deposits increasing by 28% in 2000 over 1999. VW banking is the second-
biggest private banking operation in Germany and the firm has announced its intention 
to expand further. This is also true for the leasing and rental business which increased 
by 11% from 1999 to 2000. The goal for Europcar, VW’s car-rental operation, is to be-
come European market leader. Currently it holds second position after Avis with 15% 
market share in Europe. Financial services is an area VW is also focussing on regarding 
its acquisition policy. The company has announced its interest to buy ABN Amro Leas-
ing, the worldwide leading leasing company for passenger cars. With the acquisition of 
Amro-Leasing Volkswagen would have a market share of one third of the German pas-
senger car-leasing market. As Table 6 shows, financial services has the highest rate of 
return among the  reporting business units. The expectation repeatedly stressed by 
Piëchis that financial services contributes 30% to VW’s overall profits. Pischetsrieder, 
the successor to Piëch since April 2002, has already announced his intention to expand 
business in this area. Pischetsrieder also stressed the importance of financial services to 
help VW to achieve a return on sales in the order of 6-7%. Without contributions from 
financing new car sales, fleet management and used-car retailing, he suggested that 
margins would be no more than 3-4%. “Six to 7% is a possible target including finan-
cial services, which is a precondition for a successful car business.” (Financial Times, 
12.9.2001, “VW may expand financial arm”) 
Despite the announced intention to expand financial services VW has not followed Ford 
and other companies in officially announcing a strategy of “value migration” away from 
automobile manufacturing as low-margin activity towards higher-margin activities 
downstream the value chain. The official policy is that financial services supports VW’s 
core business activities of auto manufacturing. This core business as of 2000 makes up 
80% of Volkswagen’s turnover. 
The financing division, finally, is a small division in terms of people. As of the end of 
2000 it employed 72 people. The financing division “opens up access to international 
capital markets, frees the group from dependency on the economically, structurally and 
in part politically based fluctuations of the domestic credit and capital markets, and en-
ables funds to be acquired in foreign currencies and permits utilization of international 
money and capital markets.” (annual report, 2000, p. 74): Business development is 
largely determined by factoring and intra-group finance operations. Pre-tax profit to-
talled DM 342 million, up 18.8% on 1999. 
Table 7 is a breakdown of sales and their development from 1996 to 2000. There is no 
obvious shift in the relevance of the segments to be seen in this period. With regard to 
activities other than OEM production and assembly, leasing and rental business makes 
up almost 10% of turnover, spare parts almost 6% and other sales almost 5%. While the 
returns from the spare parts business have not been published it is known that they 
played an important role in contributing to overall profits and in times of crisis as in 
1993/94 cash flow from these businesses played an important role to keep the company 
a float. Volkswagen, like Ford, in recent years has sought to expand its service business. 
While Ford bought the quick repair service chain Kwik-fit, VW had bought Pit-stop for 
example. While Ford has made a U-turn in the meantime and started to sell some of its 
service businesses it had bought, VW is still continuing this policy. 
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3.6 Effects on Investment Decisions/Disinvestment Decisions 
To what extent do the new systems of target setting and controlling and new incentive 
systems affect decisions on investments? Are decisions becoming more short-term? Are 
investments in “innovative” projects (with uncertain returns) or in human capital be-
coming more difficult owing to the new orientation? Is there a tendency to downsize 
and distribute rather than retain and reinvest?  
Table 8 shows the development of capital investments in tangible fixed assets as percent 
of sales at VW AG, and most specifically for the automotive division since 1995, since 
there are separate data reported on a divisional basis. The table also shows the devel-
opment of financial investments in percent of total investment, of research and devel-
opment expenditures as percentage of sales and finally of the expenses for education 
and training as percentage of total labour costs. All these are indicators which should 
reflect the impact of a shift from a productionist orientation towards financialisation. As 
can be seen from this table, the data do not reflect such a shift. 
Table 8: Investments in Tangible Assets at Volkswagen, 1991-2000 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Capital investments in 
tangible fixed assets as 
% of sales 
– VW AG 
– automotive division 
 
 
 
10.9 
 
 
 
9.4 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
 
5.0 
 
 
 
5.0 
7.0 
 
 
 
7.2 
8.0 
 
 
 
7.2 
7.9 
 
 
 
7.3 
9.0 
 
 
 
8.0 
8.0 
 
 
 
6.6 
8.0 
Financial investments 
in % of total invest-
ment* 
9.3 5.8 4.2 11.7 8.1 8.6 9.2 11.4 7.1 13.0 
R&D/Sales (%) 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.6 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 5.6 6.0 
Expenses for educa-
tion and training as % 
of total labour costs 
 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
* own calculation 
Source: Volkswagen AG, Annual Reports 
As Table 8 shows, capital investment in tangible fixed assets as percentage of sales for 
the automobile business during the six years 1995-2000 was around 8%. The Head of 
Finance in VW’s Executive Board on a presentation for the Association of European 
Automotive Analysts in December 2000 pointed out that Volkswagen regarded this per-
centage as too high. He stated Volkswagen’s intent to bring this ratio over the mid-term 
back to the level of VW’s main competitors during the period 1995-1999 (cf. Fig. 2).  
The same holds true for the investment/R&D ratio. According to the CFO the average 
ratio of competitors (Honda, GM, PSA, Ford, DC, Fiat and Renault) during 1995-1999 
was 10.6%. The VW Group with 11.8% again had invested more in its product pro-
gramme than the average of the competitors. In the future VW would also go back to 
the average competition level of the past five years.  
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Fig. 2: Investment Ratios (Investment as Percentage of Sales of Selected Auto 
Companies 1995-1999) 
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Source: Presentation of B. Adelt, member of the executive board (Volkswagen AG) to the As-
sociation of European automotive analysts’ meeting, December 6th, 2000, Wolfsburg;
  
http://www.volkswagen-ir.de/deutsch/08/html/adelt/chart4.html of 25.9.2001 
This cap on investments decided by the planning round of 2000 and presented to the 
financial analysts by the head of finance, is one of the few indications that Volkswagen 
indeed has changed its policy giving priority to financial goals. At Audi investments in 
the first half of 2001 was reduced by 13%. The cap on investment has already provoked 
critical comments from the site of the works council. 
Has there been a shift from internal growth towards acquisitions in Volkswagen’s 
growth strategy?  
During in the last 15 years acquisitions have solely focussed on automotive-related 
businesses, and this is true for most of the companies’ history. There was only one pe-
riod when conglomeration strategy was pursued. This was in the mid-70s. In order to 
reduce its dependence on the automotive industry VW had decided to strategically 
broaden the scope of its business. In 1978 Volkswagen purchased the Triumph-Adler 
Group and consolidated it as an affiliate in business machine and information technol-
ogy. The board of management declared this to be part of long term company policy. 
The new Triumph Werke AG employed around 14,000 persons in 1979, and had sales 
of 1.2 billion DM. The general perception was that the acquisition was more than just a 
financial manoeuvre. It was seen rather in the context of Volkswagen’s technology ori-
entation, and it was anticipated that the whole group would benefit from the technologi-
cal potential of its computer affiliate. But these hopes were soon shattered. The Tri-
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umph Adler Group lost money and was in need of a long-term strategy itself. Volks-
wagen’s management sought a way out and, in 1986, sold these businesses to Olivetti.  
Fig. 3: R&D Expenses as a Percentage of Investment in Fixed Assets of 
Selected Auto Companies 
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Source: Presentation of B. Adelt, member of the executive board (Volkswagen AG) to the As-
sociation of European automotive analysts’ meeting, December 6th, 2000, Wolfsburg;
  
http://www.volkswagen-ir.de/deutsch/08/html/adelt/chart3.html of 25.9.2001 
The failure of Volkswagen’s diversification policy cannot be analysed in detail here. 
The general weakness of the European computer industry is part of the explanation. 
Also notable was Volkswagen’s own short-term orientation to its supposedly “long-
term strategic” commitment at that time. Volkswagen’s top management decided to 
abandon the computer field less than five years after entering it. The strategy of diversi-
fication was laid to rest, replaced by renewed focus on the core business. 
A look into recent M&As does not suggest a shift away from the focus on car produc-
tion in the sense of a motoring matrix policy suggested by Froud et al.(1998). Mergers 
& acquisitions in 2000: 
– Acquisition of a 18.7% holding in the Swedish commercial vehicle manufacturer 
Scania AB. The holding entails 34.0% of the voting rights. 
– Acquisition of the remaining 30% of shares in Škoda Auto. As a result, Volkswagen 
is now the sole stockholder in that company. 
– Establishment of Bugatti Automobile as a wholly owned subsidiary. 
– Volkswagen Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft mbH acquired the remaining shares of the 
former joint venture company Europcar International. 
An analysis (which shall not be elaborated here further) of Volkswagen’s direct or indi-
rect affiliates confirms a policy of close orientation toward automotive-related busi-
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nesses. Altogether the Volkswagen AG has a direct or indirect interest of over 50% in 
31 German group companies and 112 foreign group companies, according to the 2000 
annual report. 48 German and 74 foreign affiliated companies are not consolidated. Par-
ticipation: Income from affiliated companies in 2000: 388 million DM, from associated 
companies 330 million DM, from valuation of holdings in associated companies 
456 million DM. Including other incomes and expenses altogether 976 million DM. 
Disinvestments:  
Turning to disinvestments, there is no indication of a shift towards a “downsize & dis-
tribute” policy nor a policy of the degree of vertical integration at VW. The company 
has not sold any of its German operations or assets of a size worth mentioning except 
for the sale of Triumph-Adler mentioned above. Among its foreign operations this is 
also true except for  the dissolution of its North American production network with 
 sales of for instance its plant in Sterling Heights to Chrysler. Altogether disin-
vestments have been an extremely rare event in Volkswagen’s policy.  
This is also true for the outsourcing of operations in the area of automotive components. 
It is true that some parts production, especially in the area of small press parts, have 
been outsourced, no major component of VW’s internal parts suppliers has been out-
sourced so far. The official language is that VW does not follow a policy of outsourc-
ing. In view of the “core competencies” talk and the examples set by GM and Ford 
spinning off their component businesses into separate companies, there is a discussion 
on the future of component business within Volkswagen, however. At the current stage 
this discussion is largely dominated by the question how to develop competencies in 
order to enable VW’s component units to compete on equal footing with independent 
component suppliers. The capability to become systems suppliers and the need to de-
velop capabilities in the area of electronics are areas of concern in this regard. Alto-
gether Volkswagen’s component workforce makes up 80,000 of VW’s workforce of 
around 320,000. Thus the head of the corporate works council repeatedly is stressing 
the need for a coherent “component strategy”. In view of the increasing relevance of 
electronics and software, the company has developed an “electronics strategy” to initi-
ate insourcing in core areas. On the whole, it seems that insourcing and capability de-
velopment in the productive field are more urgent issues than outsourcing at VW. 
Evidence of a policy of shifting the distribution of returns to stockholders can also not 
be observed. Table 9 does not show a relevant shift of returns to stockholders. Rather 
the state (taxes), creditors (interests) and the company (reserves) had been profiting 
from the increase of added value since the mid-1990s. The proportion allocated to em-
ployees, in contrast, was reduced sharply as the productivity increase during this period 
was not accompanied by proportional wage increase. Shareholder pressure and the fear 
of a hostile take-over played their parts to legitimate this development. 
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Finally, VW has also not followed a policy of downsizing employment and close plants. 
When the pressure was there, during the crisis years 1993/94, it rather pursued a policy 
of reducing the weekly working hours.7 
When in Autumn 1993 plans, forecasts and commitments were tallied up for the next 
two years it became evident that a total of 30,000 employees would have to go, a good 
quarter of VW AG’s 108,000 employees. This situation was due to the economic reces-
sion, but also to VW’s investment in new capacity since the late 1980s, a reduction in 
the degree of vertical integration and the various measures to improve productivity and 
performance. In regard to the programs like CIP and group work specifically, all actors 
were aware that the company would no longer be able to count on shop floor participa-
tion, if dismissals on such a scale took place. Moreover, industrial peace at VW itself 
would be threatened if management insisted on mass dismissals. It was quite character-
istic of Volkswagen’s governance structure that quick joint action was possible in this 
situation. An agreement between IG Metall and Volkswagen was struck to reduce work-
ing hours in order to share the work among the existing employees. The reduction of 
weekly working hours by 20% (from 36 to 28.2 hours) secured 20,000 jobs; the remain-
ing 10,000 were to be secured by additional measures. The reduction of work time was 
paid for by a reduction of income on an annual basis (between 10 and 11%) and by re-
ducing the number of special holidays. In return for these concessions the company 
guaranteed an employment level of 100,000 for Volkswagen AG. (Of the other group 
companies only Audi followed with a similar agreement reducing the weekly working 
hours there by 10%.) A major element of the work sharing agreement was that every-
body in the company should share the burden of income reduction. Thus management 
up to the members of the executive board where also affected by the income reduction. 
With regard to the shortening of the working hours however, no restriction was put on 
management. In fact, the working hours of many senior white-collar employees and of 
management increased considerably because of the reduction of working hours for em-
ployees covered by the collective agreement. 
The work sharing agreement was designed as a measure to cope with the difficult em-
ployment situation, but it was not perceived as temporary. Its duration was limited to 
two years with the understanding that it would be continued. In September 1995 a new 
agreement was reached, however with some modifications. Thus, a “performance con-
tribution” of the indirect areas was introduced raising the weekly work time for the indi-
rect hourly and salaried employees by 1.2 hours up to 30 hours per week. Another 
modification was the flexibilisation of working time to a maximum of 38 hours per 
week as long as the 28.8 or 30 hours average was reached over a one year period. In a 
follow-up agreement of June 1996 this one year limitation was abandoned and the con-
cept of an individual “time asset” was created whereby overtime work (exceeding 28.8 
or 30 hours) could be saved on an individual time bank-account for longer leave or ab-
sence or for early retirement. The flexibilisation of weekly work time was regarded by 
                                                 
7 Employment security had been a central issue at Volkswagen since the mid-1970s, and the policy 
of avoiding dismissals was a centrepiece of VW’s industrial model from that point on. A former 
labour director entitled a book he edited on the employment risks of new technology “Working 
Without Fear” (Briam, 1986). His successor in 1993 took up this motto in his book on the work 
sharing agreement in 1993: “Each Workplace has a Human Face” (Hartz, 1994). 
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management as an important step to give factories space to “breathe” in response to 
fluctuations in order volumes (see Hartz, 1996). 
In the current situation of an expected global recession, this approach is widely ac-
claimed even by its former critics. Due to the possibility to respond to shifts in demand 
and “breathe” with its capacity in a corridor between 21.8 and 38.8 hours Volkswagen 
is seen to be well prepared for a recession (cf. Roland Berger and financial analysts 
quoted in Wolfsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 10.10.2001, “Volkswagen gilt als krisen-
fest”). 
3.7 The Works Councils as Guardians against Short-Termedness 
If we don’t find any evidence of a shift towards financialisation in the figures, what 
about the processes? Of particular importance in this regard is the process of investment 
planning and investment decisions. Let us take a closer look at these processes now.  
Investment decisions are part of the yearly “planning rounds”. The planning process is 
from June to October, the decision is in November. In the first stage the decentralized 
areas, plants, put together their investment plans. The aggregated plans usually exceed 
the financing possibilities of the company. During the following months central finance 
and the decentralized areas work out the details and try to narrow the gap between what 
they think is necessary or financially viable. During the budgetary period, performance 
is monitored on a monthly basis. There is no general policy on sanctions for overrun-
ning the budget. In any case, it is more a career issue than one of bonus payments or 
stock options if performance targets are not reached resp. beaten. In the business areas 
the question of deciding sanctions for deviating from targets can be decided decentrally. 
Keeping to the budget could indeed be a criterion for bonus allocation. 
During the planning round, the works council is closely involved throughout the whole 
period. Already at this decentralized, works level of detailed planning, the works coun-
cils are intensively involved. This is also true for the financial assessment of investment 
projects. As part of the policy of “location protection” works councils are particularly 
interested in attracting innovative projects such as the 3-litre car, and of preventing out-
sourcing. Thus in the case of innovation projects proposed by R&D, according to a 
works council interviewee during our investigation, a point to check would be whether 
the new product can be produced in-house and whether investment in process equip-
ment and competencies are to be made to this end. For instance, the works council 
would point at the need to better coordinate product and process engineering points of 
view. While this may also be part of the original investment proposal, the works council 
observes that from the R&D perspective it seems irrelevant whether the new part is pro-
duced in-house or by a supplier. However, from the view of protecting employment 
using and developing in-house capacities would be better, of course. 
Investment projects have to meet the criterion of a 40% return on investment (ROI), i.e. 
they have to amortise within 2 ½ years. This period even has been shortened in recent 
time. How does this affect projects which are more long-term oriented, but with a high 
innovation potential?  
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There are two special funds for business area projects beyond their normal budgets. One 
is a fund for insourcing and innovative investment endowed with a three-digit million 
DM sum. Projects supported by these funds do not have to reach the 40% ROI limit. 
The second fund is for innovation-related overhead costs. Both funds are intended to 
provide impulse money for new processes and are used mainly by cross-functional pro-
jects. Often the innovation projects thus funded here are human-capital oriented. The 
emphasis is not on technology development as this is regarded as a standard task to be 
financed out of the normal budgets.  
As to the question whether the shift towards decentralized controlling systems and re-
sult orientation has negative effects on vocational and further training spending: Is there 
reluctance on the part of business unit management to “buy” services from the training 
department which was set up as an independent subsidiary at Volkswagen, the “Coach-
ing-GmbH”? In order to prevent such an attitude among decentralized management, the 
cost of apprenticeship training is covered by central overhead. Thus the budget for 
“Coaching” apprenticeship training is negotiated between finance and Coaching at the 
central level. In the past this was also the case with regard to further training. This has 
changed and the business areas now have to pay for further training out of their budgets. 
There is no indication of attempts by decentralized management to save on further train-
ing expenses. Firstly, the budget logic is still in place, secondly even under a results-
oriented system management is not expected to save on human capital expenses. In any 
case the works council has a clear position should this happen. If there were a problem 
with training expenses, according to the works council interviewee, the works council 
would make sure that finance was provided. At the same time it would support meas-
ures to make training more cost-efficient and effective and thus save on the costs and 
take an active position in reforming the vocational training system. Here we have an-
other example of co-management. With regard to further training Volkswagen has in-
stalled a system to make sure that training expenses necessary in connection with the 
introduction of new technology do not fall prey to financial constraints. The system 
goes back as far as joint agreements between the company and the works council in the 
1980s. For each investment project of a certain size (the threshold is usually 
DM 1 million) planners are required to factor in costs for further training in the cost 
calculation for the investment project. Project plans have to include a detailed account 
of impacts on personnel in terms of headcount, qualification, training requirements. 
After the investment project has been approved, the money for further training is part of 
the budget and “Coaching”, the VW training subsidiary, can use this as a planning basis 
for designing its training activities.  
Spending on further training thus has to go through the ROI calculations. And, accord-
ing to our interviews, conflict often arises in trying to reach the 40% target training ex-
penses. But, in the event of conflict, Coaching as a training needs protagonist can al-
ways rely on support from very high up in the supervisory board. 
As was already mentioned, there has been no major case of outsourcing at VW. Despite 
considerable activities in this sector Volkswagen has not (yet) established a separate 
business unit for automotive supplies. Besides engines and transmission VW still pro-
duces drive train components such as axles, steering gear, brakes, it still has instrument 
panel production and seating components. Instead of outsourcing its component produc-
tion Volkswagen has pursued a policy of upgrading the capabilities of its component 
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production units. They have to compete with external suppliers in the bidding process 
for new production programs, however, and thereby to demonstrate their cost competi-
tiveness. Rather than following an outsourcing policy the company has sought to de-
velop the capabilities of its component units (specifically in the area of breaking sys-
tems and drive train parts), to upgrade their R&D potential and develop them into sys-
tems suppliers. In view of the increasing relevance of electronics and software, the 
company has developed an “electronics strategy” to initiate insourcing in core areas. 
The obvious productionist orientation regarding the structure of the company and the 
range of operations has become an issue of controversy just recently. Obviously relating 
to discussions in the context of the 2001 planning round the head of VW’s corporate 
council, Volkert, recently came out publicly demanding an “energetic strategy in the 
area of component and electronics production within the group”. The author demanded 
that the West German VW locations should be modernised through a special investment 
programme. They should be made fit for the future by raising them to the same level of 
technology of the new factories of the group in The Czech Republic, Brazil and Hun-
gary. If the executive board wants group-internal competition, the head of the works 
council argued, it has to make sure that the plants compete under same conditions. In 
view of the “future challenge auto electronics” he demanded more emphasis and money. 
It cannot be, he argued, that such a strategy would be judged primarily under budgetary 
aspects “with the mentality of bean counters”. In the future all auto components will be 
based on electronics and accordingly more and more value-added and employment in 
auto production will be dependent on electronics. We have to prevent a scenario, Volk-
ert demanded, that in the future there will be a Golf made by Bosch or Sony with the 
design coming from Volkswagen. (“VW braucht Elektronik-Kompetenz”, an interview 
with the head of the works council Klaus Volkert, Braunschweiger Zeitung, 25.7.2001) 
3.8 Transition at the Top: A Critical Test 
In a meeting held at the beginning of September 2001, the supervisory board, unexpect-
edly, nominated the successor of Piëch as head of Volkswagen’s executive board from 
April 2002. Originally this decision was expected for the November meeting of the su-
pervisory board. The surprise decision was the result of meetings between the Prime 
Minister of the Land Niedersachsen and the representatives of the IG Metall and the 
works council on the supervisory board determined to take action in order to prevent 
further speculations regarding Piëch’s plans concerning successorship. But there were 
other reasons behind this early nomination commented by the press as slap on the face 
of Piëch.  
One reason was dissatisfaction with Volkswagen’s venture into the luxury range of car 
production. From the works council side this policy has been criticised repeatedly as 
burning money which better could have been spent on niche cars missing in Volks-
wagen’s product range such as sport utilities and on modernising Volkswagen’s Ger-
man production plants in order to make them competitive with the new sites set up 
abroad.  
Another reason were plans to restructure the corporation into a holding, thereby merg-
ing Volkswagen’s eight brands into two separate product lines, one for sporty and one 
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for classic cars. In this way Volkswagen and Audi would have lost their prominent posi-
tions within the VW Group being merged, organisationally, with Škoda, resp. Seat etc. 
The third reason was the way Piëch had criticised Audi. In a quite unusual way Piëch 
had criticised Audi to have dramatically failed in reaching its target rate of return. Piëch 
also criticised a lack of innovativity in Audi’s product development activities. While 
this critique was obviously related to Piëch’s plans of restructuring Volkswagen and a 
justification for depriving Audi of its independence, it was also a manifestation of the 
rigidity with which Piëch had pursued his intention of achieving the goal of the 6.5% 
return on sales target. The way in which Audi reacted was indeed confirming all the 
critiques concerning the negative consequences of financialisation. To reach the 6.5% 
target Audi desperately sought to save on all accounts. With 4.1% Audi had markedly 
underperformed in the first half year. As a consequence R&D budgets were reduced or 
cut altogether. According to information from R&D employees at Audi reported by the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, recruitment into product development was stopped and 
many development projects were delayed by four months until 2002 (Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 8.9.2001, “Warum bei Volkswagen kräftig gespart werden muss”). 
While the head of the corporate works council did not observe such negative conse-
quences of the profitability target as a general tendency, there was obvious concern. In 
any case, the successor of Piëch, Pischetsrieder, in his first statements has put the fixa-
tion of a rigid rate of return target into question: “There would be no problem to show a 
6.5% rate of return in the balance sheet. We could achieve this by just reducing the in-
vestments. But this is exactly what we don’t want to do.” According to Pischetsrieder, 
this was the very mistake made by Chrysler, once the car company with the highest rate 
of profitability. The US company had invested only 3.5% of turnover as compared to an 
industry average of 8%. (Financial Times Deutschland, 12.9.2001) 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Summarising our findings, we relate to the six central questions of this study listed in 
the introduction. 
Firstly, to what extent have the distinct characteristics of VW’s corporate governance 
system changed in response to capital market/shareholder-value demands? Characteris-
tic features of Volkswagen’s corporate governance system are the special role of the 
state based on the Volkswagen-law and the special industrial relations system. We have 
not found a fundamental change of this corporate governance system due to capital 
market pressure and shareholder value demands. The distinctiveness of the corporate 
governance system was confirmed rather by the way a response to this pressure on these 
demands were sought. Shareholder value has not become the primary goal at VW as it 
has in other companies. Rather the need to balance this goal with other stakeholder in-
terests was stressed. The concept of “workholder value” is a manifestation of this. 
All measures related to shareholder value in the company were carried jointly by man-
agement and works council. This does not mean that there were no conflicts in specific 
cases. As the events in connection with the early nomination of a successor to Piëch has 
shown these fundamentals of VW’s corporate governance systems have demonstrated 
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their strength and resilience in times of conflict. In such a situation as was formulated 
recently by a leading representative of VW’s corporate works council, the representa-
tion of labour interests in the supervisory board based on the codetermination system 
and the VW-Gesetze and the block ownership of shares by the Land Niedersachsen to-
gether make up a “bulwark against short-termed profit thinking of capital” (Uhl: “Ein 
Bollwerk gegen das Kapital”, in: Wolfsburger Nachrichten, 19.9.2001). 
Secondly, what is the role of stock markets and to what extent does VW rely on stocks 
to finance operations? It is the policy of the company to finance its operations out of the 
cash flow. There have been only few occasions in VW’s history so far, when new capi-
tal was issued and this was related in most cases with major acquisitions or new product 
programmes. Since a few years the function of shares as potential “acquisition money” 
has received special attention at Volkswagen. In view of the unfavourable conditions on 
the stock markets, negative responses of investors and financial analysts to issue new 
capital for acquisition purposes, Volkswagen has not used this instrument on a wide 
scale so far. However, the company disposes of a full chest of such acquisition money 
after the company has realised a 10% share buy-back programme and has received the 
authorisation to buy back another 10% of its shares. It can therefore be expected that 
major acquisitions could be announced in the future (a recent example was ABN Amro-
Leasing, as was described earlier). 
Rather than as a means for financing the more important role the stock market played 
for Volkswagen was in its function as a market for corporate control. The low market 
valuation of the company made it an easy pray for attempts of a hostile takeover. In 
view of the critique of the Volkswagen-law by the EU and rumoured interests of car 
companies to buy VW this was regarded as a real threat by the actors at VW. The fear 
of a hostile takeover has been the main driver for a number of measures to enhance in-
vestor relations and improve the profitability of the company. 
Thirdly, have incentive systems changed in the direction of capital-market oriented per-
formance measures? If we narrow this down to the question of introduction of stock 
options – stock options have been introduced since recently. However, the connection to 
business unit performance is weak. The opening up of the stock options programme to 
the general workforce shows a more general intent to increase employee stock owner-
ship and not to use stock options specifically to motivate in the direction of capital mar-
ket oriented performance. 
Fourthly, have systems of target setting and controlling changed to better correspond 
with shareholder expectations? As was shown, the setting of a fixed profit target and a 
strong commitment of top management to achieve this, has been driving changes after it 
was linked to a specific date. As the events around Audi in 2001 have shown, non-
performing in view of these targets can have quite negative consequences for individual 
business units. But the Audi case was special, it was linked with other considerations of 
company politics. At the current stage it is unclear to what extent the targets will actu-
ally affect management decisions decentrally und what effects reaching or not reaching 
targets have for decentral management. 
Fifthly, on effects regarding decisions of investment and disinvestment. What is the 
effect on the long-term innovation potential of the firms? The events around Audi have 
shown that there is a real danger for long-term innovation if performance targets play 
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the dominant role. At the same time these events have shown the crucial role of the 
works councils and of Volkswagen’s corporate governance system to keep performance 
goals in balance with other goals. The involvement of the works councils in VW’s co-
management environment so far has strongly supported productionist orientation 
against financialisation. The works councils play a unique role compared to other car 
manufacturers in the degree of involvement in investment planning and investment de-
cisions. This has led to the fact that VW did not follow other companies with regard to 
outsourcing and disinvestment. The company has rather sought to insource critical new 
component technologies and corresponding capabilities. 
Sixthly and finally, what are the effects on economic and financial performance? As 
Table 10 shows, key financial figures have developed positively during the period we 
discussed in this paper. The figures show clearly a positive trend. Thus we can conclude 
that the balanced approach of shareholder and workholder interests did not have a nega-
tive impact on financial indicators. This finding is confirmed when we compare Volks-
wagen’s performance with the performance of competitors which have put different 
emphasis on shareholder value orientation. A comparison between Fiat, PSA, Renault 
and Volkswagen has come to the following result (Jürgens et al., 2002):  
Table 10: Key Figures Relating to VW’s Financial and Earnings Position 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cash-flow as % of capital investments in 
tangible fixed assets1) 
99.7 92.7 102.3 102.9 122.2 
Cash-flow as % of sales proceeds1) 7.9 7.3 9.2 8.2 9.7 
Capital investments in tangible fixed assets as 
% of sales proceeds1) 
8.0 7.9 9.0 8.0 8.0 
Return on sales before tax (%) 2.0 3.4 4.7 3.4 4.1 
Return on sales after tax (%) 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.1 2.4 
Return on equity after tax (%) 5.2 9.8 13.6 8.6 19.1 
Return on investment after tax (%)1) 2)  4.8 7.3 6.9 7.0 
1) Automotive Division, from 1999 excluding Financing Division 
2) Standardized operating profit after tax as percentage of average capital invested for the return 
(ROI or ROCE) 
If we order the trend towards shareholder value management policy for the four car 
companies studied, the scale would be: from VW (less) to PSA, then Renault and, fi-
nally, Fiat (more). This order is clearly not related to the type of control, family/state. 
The analysis of these firms trajectories needs other hypotheses (for example Boyer and 
Freyssenet, 2002), which clearly confirm the limited role of this explanation factor. 
If we take the two indicators employment development and development of gross profit 
margins as the economic performance indicators representing the different points of 
interest of employees on the one hand and of shareholders on the other, the companies 
rank almost in the reverse order to their ranking according to their shareholder value 
management policy: companies which are the more engaged towards shareholder value 
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policy are the less performing for capital as well as labour (Fiat, and Renault whose 
2001’s results would be worth) and the better performers are the more reluctant to the 
introduction of shareholder value policy (PSA and VW).8 In view of our findings we 
may even reverse the causality and claim that the companies which achieve better eco-
nomic performance have been less under pressure of shareholders, especially institu-
tional investors (Dupuy and Lung, 2002). 
Table 11: Two Criteria for Economic Performance in the 90s: Employment and 
Gross Profit Margin 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Employment growth 
(index 100 in 1995) 
      
Fiat Group 100.0 100.2 102.1 92.9 93.2 94.3 
PSA 100.0 99.4 100.2 111.9 118.5 122.9 
Renault 100.0 100.7 101.0 98.8 114.0 118.7 
VW AG 100.0 107.5 113.3 122.9 126.3 133.8 
Gross profit margin 
(profit before tax/revenue) 
      
Fiat Group 4.5% 4.9% 4.7% 3.2% 2.1% 1.8% 
PSA 1.3% 0.4% -0.2% 2.4% 3.1% 5.0% 
Renault 1.1% -3.1% 2.0% 4.6% 3.1% 4.3% 
VW AG 1.3% 2.0% 3.4% 4.7% 5.0% 4.8% 
Source: Volkswagen Annual Reports 
In the short term it seems to be clear that economic performance in the auto industry is 
explained by other factors, especially by the success of the product policy. But the 
changing of corporate governance may have an effect on the medium/long term, as it 
implies a progressive change in the routines of the companies at all levels. 
Altogether, VW presents a particular interesting case of responding to capital market 
pressures and shareholder value demands while continuing a productionist orientation 
and emphasising the need for long-term capability development. 
 
                                                 
8 Another source confirms this result: In July 2001, the Total Shareholder Return Index calculated 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers and published by Automotive News Europe indicated that PSA Peu-
geot-Citroën outperformed during the last twelve months – as well as the last three years – in the 
European car industry, while Fiat is the worst (destruction of shareholder value) regarding the two 
same criteria. VW follows PSA, performing better than Renault for 2000/2001. 
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